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JURISDICTION 
This court has jurisdiction to hear this appeal pursuant to Utah Code Annotated 
§ 78-2a-3. This is an appeal from a final Order in the Third District Court of Salt Lake 
County, State of Utah. 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
DID THE TRIAL COURT COMMIT REVERSIBLE ERROR IN 
FINDING THAT RES JUDICATA PREVENTED APPELLANT FROM 
PURSUING A CLAIM FOR DAMAGES WITH REGARD TO 
PERSONAL INJURIES. 
STANDARD OF REVIEW 
Summary judgment is appropriate only when there are no genuine issues of material 
fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Ault v. Holden, 44 P.3d 
781,787 (Utah 2002). In reviewing an order granting summary judgment, this court reviews 
for correctness and accords no deference to the trial court's legal conclusions. Holmes Dev., 
LLC v. Coolc 48 P.3d 895,902 (Utah 2002). Further, when determining whether summary 
judgment is appropriate," 'we view the facts and all reasonable inferences drawn therefrom 
in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party.1 ,f Ault, 44 P.3d at 787 (citing PCM Inv. 
Corp. v. Pinecrest Inv. Co., 34 P.3d 785, 787-88 (Utah 2001)). 
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STATEMENT OF CASE 
Nature of the Case and Course of Proceedings 
On July 19, 2001, Plaintiff/Appellant Ilia Dennis brought this action in the Third 
Judicial District Court to recover compensation for bodily injuries he sustained as a result 
of an automobile collision with Defendant/Appellee David Vasquez. Said automobile 
collision occurred on October 6,2000 at the intersection of 14400 South and Pony Express 
Road in Salt Lake County, State of Utah. (Record on Appeal at 2.) 
Prior to filing of this action, on February 23, 2001, Plaintiff, without the knowledge 
or advice of counsel, filed a small claims action (Case No. 018200663) seeking to collect 
$1,227.35 for property damage to his vehicle and reimbursement of rental car expenses 
incurred as a result of the October 6 collision. (Record at 20.) At the small claims hearing 
on March 29, 2001, the Defendant argued the action should be dismissed because of a 
release purportedly signed by the Plaintiff for settlement of his property damage claim 
against the Defendant. Based upon this release, the small claims court entered judgment of 
"no cause of action." (Record at 20.) Note: To date, Defendant has yet to produce any 
release between the Defendant and Plaintiff settling Plaintiffs damages to Plaintiffs 
vehicle. 
In response to Plaintiffs Complaint in this action, Defendant filed a Motion for 
Summary Judgment on the grounds that the claim for bodily injuries was barred under the 
doctrine of res judicata because of the March 29,2001 small claims court decision. Plaintiff 
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argued in his reply that the claim should not be barred on the basis of res judicata because 
the elements of the defense were not met; the small claims u mrt latieti the jurisdiction to 
hear the claim for bodily injuries; and that equities of this case supported a denial of 
Defendant's Motion. (Record at 42-46.) Specifically, Plaintiff challenged whether the small 
claims court action was a final ruling on the merits, that the issues in both cases were 
identical, and the authenticity of the purported release. On or about March 25, 2002, the 
Third Judicial District Court, adopting Defendant's arguments, issued a Memorandum 
Decision granting the Motion for Summary Judgment and dismissing the Plaintiffs claims 
on the basis that the claim was barred under the doctrine of res judicata. (Record at 74-77.) 
Statement of Facts and Disposition 
1. On or about October 6,2002, Appellant Dennis was involved in an automobile 
collision with Appellee Vasquez at the intersection of 14400 South and Pony Express Road 
in Salt Lake County, State of Utah. Appellee Vasquez, failed to yield the right-of-way when 
proceeding through a stop sign. As a result of the collision, Appellant sustained bodily 
injury. (Record at 2-3.) 
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2. Subsequent to the collision, Appellee's insurer, State Farm, issued a check to 
the Appellant in the amount of $4,650.06 for the property damage caused by the collision.1 
(Record at 29.) 
3. On February 23,2001, Appellant, without the knowledge or advice of counsel, 
filed a small claims action against the Appellee seeking to recover $ 1,227.35 for the portion 
of property damage remaining unpaid by State Farm, Defendant's insurer.2 (Record at 30.) 
4. On March 29, 2001, the small claims court, relying upon the Release 
purportedly signed by Appellant, issued a ruling of no cause of action for Appellee. (Record 
at 30.) 
5. On July 19, 2001, Appellant, by and through counsel, filed a complaint in the 
Third Judicial District Court for Salt Lake County seeking damages for personal injuries 
sustained in the October 6,2000, collision. No claim for property damages was made by the 
Appellant. (Record at 1-4.) 
1
 This amount reflects an apportionment of fault for the accident between Dennis and 
Vasquez. State Farm determined Vasquez was eighty percent (80%) at fault and Dennis the 
remaining twenty percent (20%). Furthermore, the Release forming the basis of the small claims 
court decision and included as Exhibit A to the Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment does 
not even pertain to the settlement for property damages between Appellant and State Farm. The 
Release does not bear the signature of Appellant, is not for the amount of $4,650.06, and was 
witnessed June 11, 2001, some three and one half months after the small claims hearing. 
2
 Apparently, the Appellant felt that the property damage payment by State Farm 
apportioning twenty percent (20%) fault to him was unacceptable and challenged this in small 
claims court. 
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6. On December 12, 2001, Appellee filed a Motion for Summary Judgment 
arguing that Appellant's claim should be dismissed on the grounds of res judicata. Appellee 
argued the small claims court decision was a final adjudication on the merits of the claims 
between the Appellee and Appellant, that the parties were identical, and that the claim could 
have and should have been raised by the Appellant. (Record at 27.) 
7. On December 24, 2001, Appellant filed his Memorandum in Opposition to 
Appellee's Motion. Appellant contended that the claim for personal injuries was not barred 
on the grounds of res judicata. Specifically, the issues were not identical, the small claims 
decision was not a final judgment on the merits, and that equity was best served by allowing 
the claim for personal injuries to proceed. (Record at 40-46.) 
8. On March 22, 2002, a Memorandum Decision was issued by Judge Iwasaki 
granting the Appellee's Motion for Summary Judgment. (Record at 74-77 and as appended 
hereto as Addendum "A".) 
9. An Order embodying the Decision was entered on May 6, 2002. On May 23, 
2002, Appellant filed a timely Notice of Appeal in the Third Judicial District Court of Salt 
Lake County, State of Utah. (Record at 79-82 and 84-85 and as appended hereto as 
Addendum "B" and "C".) 
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RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Appellant seeks reversal of the trial court's ruling granting Appellee's Motion for 
Summary Judgment. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
The Trial Court erred in granting the Defendant/Appellee's Motion for Summary 
Judgment because all elements necessary for a finding of res judicata were not satisfied in 
the current action. Specifically, the Court erred in finding that Plaintiff/Appellant could 
have and should have raised his bodily injury claim in the small claims court proceeding, 
that the issues before the small claims court were identical, and that the decision of the small 
claims court was a final judgment on the merits of the claim. Finally, the Trial Court failed 
to consider the equities of this action which favor permitting Appellant to proceed on the 
substantive merits of the case. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE TRIAL COURT COMMITTED REVERSIBLE ERROR IN 
FINDING THAT THE PLAINTIFF/APPELLANT'S CLAIM FOR 
BODILY INJURIES WAS BARRED UNDER THE DOCTRINE OF 
RES JUDICATA. 
As defined by the Utah Supreme Court, res judicata or claim preclusion has three 
elements; both suits must involve the same parties or their privies, the claim which is barred 
6 
must have been presented in the first suit or must have been one that could have or should 
have been presented in the first suit, and the first suit must have resulted in a judgment upon 
the merits. See Estate of Covington v. Josephson, 888 P.2d 675, 677 (Utah App. 1994) 
(citing Schaer v. State ex rel. UDOT. 657 P.2d 1337, 1340 (Utah 1983) and Madsen v. 
Borthick, 769 P.2d 245, 247 (Utah 1988)). 
In the instant case, the District Court found that all three elements were met. 
However, it is the Appellant's position that, while the litigants in both cases were identical, 
the causes of action in both cases are not, that the Appellant's claim for personal injuries 
should and could not have been raised, that the judgment was not final and on the merits, 
and that the equities and policy implications behind this action support a reversal of the 
District Court's granting of Appellee/Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment. 
The first element of res judicata is that both suits involve the same parties or their 
privies. Estate of Covington, 888 P.2d at 677. Appellant does not dispute that this element 
is met in the current action. The parties here are the exact same as the parties in the small 
claims action. Clearly, the trial court decision on this point is not erroneous. However die 
defense of res judicata fails on all other prerequisites to application warranting a reversal and 
remand to the District Court for resolution on the substantive merits of Mr. Dennis' personal 
injury claim. 
A. THE BODILY INJURY ACTION AND THE PROPERTY 
DAMAGE/SMALL CLAIMS COURT ACTION DO NOT RAISE 
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IDENTICAL ISSUES NOR COULD THE FORMER HAVE BEEN 
ASSERTED IN THE SMALL CLAIMS COURT. 
The second element of claim preclusion requires that both suits involve the same 
issue or that the claim should have or could have been raised in the first suit. IcL 888 P.2d 
at 678. In this case, the Trial Court agreed with Appellee's argument that Mr. Dennis could 
have or should have raised or pursued his claim for personal injuries in the small claims 
action which sought recovery of damages for his vehicle. Appellee proposes that since both 
causes of action, that for property damages and the one for personal injuries, arose from the 
same automobile collision they therefore should have been raised together or addressed in 
one single suit. 
It is true that a "cause of action" has been defined as "the aggregate of operative facts 
which give rise to a right enforceable in the court" and a "claim" as "situation or state of 
facts which entitles a party to sustain an action and gives him the right to seek judicial 
interference in his behalf." See American Estate Management Corp. v. International 
Investment and Development Corp., 986 P.2d 765, 767 (Utah App. 1999) (citations 
omitted). However, Utah courts have expressed a sincere willingness for flexibility in 
defining a claim, by stating that "[d]efining the scope of a claim or cause of action is not an 
exact science and, in fact, is at times driven by the relative importance of the finality of 
judgment." IcL Application of this proposition to the current action should lead to a 
decision that the Trial Court erred in granting the Motion for Summary Judgment. 
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Finality or not "getting two bites of the apple" is most assuredly a well-recognized 
and legitimate basis for applying res judicata to two actions which arise from the same 
operative facts. However, applying these principles to the decision of a small claims court 
(particularly where that decision did not go to the central issue of negligence but was instead 
based upon a release or accord and satisfaction) is very ill-advised. Small claims court 
proceedings are by their intent and purpose informal and expeditious. 
". . . [t]here are no attorneys, no pleadings and no legal rules of evidence; 
there are no juries, and no formal findings are made on the issues presented. 
At the hearings, presentation of evidence may be sharply curtailed and the 
proceedings are often terminated in a short space of time. The 
awards-although made in accordance with the substantive law-are often 
based on the application of common case; and the spirit compromise and 
conciliation attends the proceedings." Hindmarsh v. Mock, 2001WL 521906, 
4 (Idaho App. 2001). (citations omitted) 
Simply put, a determination by a small claims court is not entitled to the same level of foil 
faith credit. "We conclude that the policies behind small claims proceedings-under which 
procedural rights provided in the regular trial courts are sacrificed in favor of cheap and 
speedy resolution-strongly militate in favor of a rule against giving preclusive res judicata 
effect to an unappealed small claims judgment. . ." Id^at 5. The finality of a small claim 
court decision in regards to property damage should not be allowed to prevent an individual 
from pursuing redress of personal injuries suffered by the negligent acts of another. 
Consistent with these principles, Appellant urges this Court to adopt some flexibility 
in its application of the "identical issue" element of res judicata to our facts. Specifically, 
Appellant asks the Court to find that the causes of action for property damage and personal 
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damages are not so intertwined or related so as to permit res judicata's prohibitions in this 
case.3 To prevent Appellant's pursuit of compensation for personal injuries he suffered in 
favor of judicial economy or convenience would be a perversion of justice and the Utah 
judicial system. To define "claim" or "cause of action" in the narrow fashion urged by 
Appellee would result in placing judicial economy and convenience above an individual's 
right to recover personal damages suffered by the commission of a tort. And of course, 
interests of judicial economy are not near as paramount when one considers the fact the 
Court here involved was one limited to small claims matters. Given the rule expressed 
above, Appellant believes this case is one where flexibility precludes application of res 
judicata under the facts of this case. 
Nor could this claim for personal injuries have been raised in the earlier small claims 
action. First, any decision by the Small Claims Court including the Appellant's personal 
injury damages would have been beyond its jurisdiction. Appellee is correct in stating that 
small claims courts do have jurisdiction over personal injury claims. Kawamoto v. Fratto, 
994 P.2d 187 (Utah 2000). However, Appellee neglected to mention that these courts have 
a limited statutory cap of $5,000 on damages they may award. Id., 994 P.2d at 191, citing 
Utah Code Ann. § 78-6-1(1) 1997. At the time of the small claims proceeding, Appellant's 
medical expenses alone surpassed $5,000. Any proceeding seeking to collect on these 
3
 Also here contrary to the notion of "identical issues" is the fact that the Small Claims 
Court ruling did not reach the central question of the parties' respective comparative fault as it 
pertains to the automobile accident. The Small Claims Court instead found the property-damage 
claim to be barred by a release or earlier settlement and satisfaction of the property damages. 
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medical expenses, the disputed portion of property damages, and any general damages 
would greatly exceed the cap. Indeed, the District Court Complaint shows the amount in 
controversy in excess of $20,000. Based upon this analysis, it is apparent that Appellant's 
personal injury damages could not or should not have been raised in the Small Claims Court 
proceeding. Had Appellant done so or been required to do so, he would be forced to accept 
an award wholly insufficient to compensate him for property damages and medical expenses 
alone, without even considering his general damages. 
Furthermore, any adjudication of Appellant's medical expenses and personal injuries 
at the small claims trial would have been premature. While Appellant had temporarily 
ceased medical treatment, his claim for personal injuries was not ripe. At the time of the 
initial filing, only two months had passed from the date of Appellant's last medical 
treatment. He was not yet medically stable. Mr. Dennis was still not in a position to know 
the full extent of his losses. Other jurisdictions, relying in part upon unresolved medical 
injuries or continuing medical treatment, have declined to permit res judicata or claim 
preclusion to bar an action for personal damages following a small claims action for property 
damages. See Miller v. Trademark Builders. L.L.C.. 2000 WL 1655276 (Conn. Super. 
2000) (citing Isaac v. Truck Service. Inc.. 253 Conn. 416, 752 A.2d 509 (Conn. 2000). 
Before applying a mechanical approach to this question, the Court should consider 
the precarious position with which a party injured in an automobile accident is confronted. 
If, as here, a tortfeasor's insurer disputes liability, a plaintiff may be unable to repair or 
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replace his damaged vehicle. He would be unable to maintain doctors visits or may have 
difficulty in continuing to work aggravating his medical condition and increasing, not 
mitigating, his financial losses. His only recourse is to seek the expeditious relief afforded 
through small claims court proceedings for recovery of the property damage aspects of the 
claim. As was the case with Mr. Dennis and the plaintiff in Isaac, any action on personal 
and bodily injuries must wait the passage of time, ongoing medical treatment and recovery 
or at a minimum, medical stability. Tort victims must have a means of ensuring 
transportation immediately after an accident destroying their vehicle. The proper and more 
equitable means of meeting these needs is to avoid res judicata in our circumstances. 
B. THE SMALL CLAIMS COURT ORDER WAS NOT A 
"JUDGMENT ON THE MERITS". 
The final element of res judicata or claims preclusion requires that the first judgment 
result in a judgment on the merits of the claim. Appellant argues that even if the small 
claims action resulted in a judgment on the merits, that judgment was only effective as to the 
merits of the Appellant's property damage claim. The Small Claims Affidavit completed 
by Appellant specifies that the action was limited to a claim for property damage. (Record 
at 38.) The decision of the Small Claims Court was limited to a claim for property damage; 
no discussion or decision regarding personal damages took place. Both parties knew the 
small claims proceeding was limited to the issue of property damage. Therefore, to say that 
the judgment reached by the Small Claims Court and relied upon by the District Court is a 
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final judgment on the merits of all the Appellant's claim is erroneous, especially if this Court 
adopts a flexible definition of claim or cause of action. 
While not precisely a procedural-type defense, res judicata is nonetheless not a 
"judgment on the merits" in a tort case such as ours. The ruling of the lower court on the 
balance allegedly owed to compensate Plaintiff for his property damages was premised upon 
a release or settlement not a finding as to the relative fault or negligence of the parties. 
Appellant respectfully urges this Court to look beyond the mere face of the Small Claims 
Judgment to its substance. When one take this judicious and equitable approach, it is clear 
beyond reasonable dispute that this element of a res judicata defense fails and a reversal is 
warranted. 
G EQUITIES PRESENT ON OUR FACTS RESTRICT APPLICATION 
OF A RES JUDICATA DEFENSE. 
Although a rigid approach suggest res judicata may apply, the equities and 
circumstances of this case require that the Trial Court's granting of Appellee's Motion for 
Summary Judgment be reversed. Reversal is warranted because, as other jurisdictions have 
recognized, the equities of the parties and the potential policy implications of the application 
of res judicata would lead to an unjust and unacceptable result. Moreover, the issue 
involved in this case is one of first impression of Utah and the application of res judicata 
could be applied prospectively; thus avoiding an unfair consequence in this case. 
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While it is occasionally recognized that claims for property damage and claims for 
personal injuries cannot be spilt, many jurisdictions find that such causes of action, if split, 
shall not be subject to attack on the grounds of res judicata. In Isaac v. Truck Service, Inc., 
the Supreme Court of Connecticut, on facts very similar to the instant case, refused to apply 
the doctrine of claim preclusion or res judicata. See Isaac, 253 Conn at 418, 752 A.2d at 
511. In Isacc, the plaintiff filed a small claims action seeking to recover property damage 
sustained in automobile collision suffered five months earlier. This claim for property 
damages was granted two months later by the small claims court. Approximately one year 
later after her medical treatment was complete, the plaintiff filed suit against the same 
defendant seeking damages for personal injuries suffered in the same accident. Faced with 
these facts, the Connecticut Appellate Court declined to apply res judicata and bar plaintiffs 
personal injury claim, basing its decision on the fact the plaintiff had not yet sought medical 
care but also upon the basic premise that the "social policy of providing a means of 
redress for personal injuries outweighs the need for finality of the small claims 
judgment." Isaac v. Truck Service, Inc., 52 Conn. App. 545, 557, 727 A.2d 733, 755 
(Conn. App. 1999) (emphasis added). 
The Connecticut Supreme Court, while disagreeing with the approach adopted by the 
Appellate Court, agreed the doctrine of claim preclusion did not apply to a claim for 
personal injuries filed in district court, where the parties litigated the question of property 
damage arising out of the same accident in small claims court. Isaac, 253 Conn, at 420, 752 
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A.2d at 512. Despite their recognition of the same rules cited by the Appellee/Defendant 
in this case, the Isaac Court determined that the mechanical application of the doctrine of 
claim preclusion should give way when it would frustrate other social values, such as redress 
of personal injuries, equally or more important than the convenience afforded by finality in 
legal controversies. Isaac, 253 Conn, at 422, 752 A.2d at 513. Furthermore, the Court, 
recognizing the nature of property damage claims, of personal injury claims, and of small 
claims courts, decided the negative policy implications created by allowing the doctrine of 
claim preclusion to bar the plaintiffs personal injury claim outweighed any gains to be had 
by allowing application of the doctrine. 
This same result was reached in Hindmarsh v. Mock, supra which involved facts 
substantially similar to the present case and Isaac. Using much the same analysis as Isaac 
and as argued by Appellant here, the Idaho Court of Appeals rejected "the mechanical 
application of res judicata principles . . ., because such would work a significant injustice 
and frustrate social policies of greater importance than repose." Hindmarsh, 2001 WL 
521906 at 5. Again, despite the rule regarding claim preclusion, the Hindmarsh Court ruled 
that the negative policy implications created by allowing res judicata to bar a suit for 
personal injuries where the parties were involved in an earlier small claims trial regarding 
property damages outweighed any gains flowing from a claim dismissal. 
Lastly, as an alternative to the arguments delineated above, Appellant asks this Court 
to adopt the spirit of the decision in Peterson v. Temple, 918 P.2d 413 (Or. 1996). In 
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Peterson, the Oregon Supreme Court agreed to prospectively implement the application of 
doctrine of res judicata to cases factually similar to the present case. In Peterson, the Oregon 
Supreme Court, while adopting the rule urged by Appellee, declined to use res judicata to 
bar the case before it. The court recognized the plaintiff had spilt his property damage and 
personal injury causes of action in reliance upon earlier decisions permitting such action. 
Peterson, 918 P.2d at 413. 
The precise issue presented by this case is one of first impression in Utah. While 
other Utah decisions have adopted the doctrine of claim preclusion and the one-action rule, 
the question of whether claims for property damages and personal damages resulting from 
a car accident can be split has never been addressed. Consequently, Appellant asks this 
Court, if it believes his claim is barred by res judicata, apply that holding prospectively such 
as was done in Peterson. By doing so, the inequities recognized in Isaac, Hindmarsh, and 
present in this case are avoided, yet the law regarding this particular issue and the 
applicability of res judicata to claims for property damages and personal injury damages is 
set for future guidance. 
CONCLUSION 
This Court should reverse the Trial Court's erroneous ruling granting the Appellee's 
Motion for Summary Judgment, and remand for trial because: 
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Plaintiff/Appellant has demonstrated that the elements of res judicata have not been 
satisfied. The claims or cause of action in both suits are not identical nor is the claim of the 
present case, personal injury damages, one which could have or should have been raised in 
the first suit, and finally, it was the expectation and understanding of both parties and the 
court that any judgment would only be a ruling with regard to property damages. 
Additionally, Plaintiff/Appellant has shown, by way of persuasive precedence, that sufficient 
grounds exist allowing this Court to, based upon policy and equitable considerations, refuse 
application of the doctrine of res judicata to the instant case. Or in the alternative, 
Plaintiff/Appellant has shown sufficient grounds for this Court to limit a holding embracing 
the Trial Court's decision to prospective application and permit the present suit seeking 
compensation for personal injury damages to continue. 
/ ^ a RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this / 0 ^ a y of October, 2002. 
SIEGFRIED & JENSEN 
AtfLichael A. Katz 
Attorneys for Plaintiff/Appellant 
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attached thereto and for the good cause shown, hereby enters the 
followi ng ru 1 :i i i- IJ ,  
This matter centers around an automobile accident occurring on 
Oct' :•••>" >: ^"" ' •:: " ;". ' 2001, plaintiff filed this Complaint. 
Subsequently, uefendant' o insurer, State harm, reached d settleinej.it 
agreement with plaintiff and paid him $4,650.06. On February 23, 
200] , j > 1 aintiff fi ] ed a 3ma ] ] :: 1 a i ins ac 1 i < »J i i n the Third District 
Court in the amount of $1,227.35, for damages and rental expenses 
as a result of the accident. On March 29, 2001 , the court i n the 
small claims action entered j udgment against the plain ti f f i: I i] i i ig 
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there was "no cause of action."1 
With this motion, defendant argues summary judgment in his 
favor is appropriate based upon res judicata. Indeed, it is 
defendant's position plaintiff failed to assert his bodily injury 
claim in the small claims proceedings, and accordingly, is barred 
from pursuing this action. Specifically, argues defendant, all the 
elements necessary to invoke claim preclusion under res judicata 
have been fulfilled: (1) both cases involve the same parties; (2) 
plaintiff's bodily injury claim could and should have been raised 
in the small claims court proceeding; and (3) the small claims 
court proceeding resulted in a final judgment on the merits in 
favor of defendant. 
Plaintiff opposes the motion arguing the decision of the small 
claims court was not on the merits, but rather, was based upon the 
Release-not upon a determination of fault. As to whether the 
issues are identical, plaintiff asserts the small claims action 
sought additional sums for property damage, while this Complaint is 
seeking personal injury damages. Finally, it is plaintiff's 
position dismissal would compel plaintiff to discharge medical 
bills attributable to the acts of defendant and such would be 
inequitable. 
]No record of the small claims proceeding is available and no 
competent affidavits were presented which indicate the events of 
the small claims proceeding. 
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Claim preclusion bars a cause of action only 
if the suit in which that cause of action is 
being asserted and the prior suit satisfy 
three requirements. First, both cases must 
involve the same parties or their privies. 
Second, the claim that is alleged to be barred 
must have been presented in the first suit or 
must be one that could and should have been 
raised in the first action. Third, the first 
suit must have resulted in a final judgment on 
the merits. 
Madsen v. Borthick, 769 P.2d 245, 247 (Utah 1988). 
Applying I lie cifor^ men t-.ioned to the facts of this case, it is 
undisputed the first requirement ^f Maasen ;--~ rr: ":.he 
second factor, the Restatement of Judgments § 24 provides: 
the rule stated in this Section as to 
splitting a claim is applicable although the 
first action is brought in a court which has 
no jurisdiction to give a judgment for more 
than a designated amount. When the plaintiff 
brings an action in such a court and recovers 
judgment for the maximum amount which the 
court can award, he is precluded from 
thereafter maintaining an action for the 
balance of his claim., It is assumed here 
that a court was available to the plaintiff in 
the same system of courts.-
In the instam •: " - exceeding the jurisdiction, of the 
small claims court, there is no dispute the personal injuries and 
expenses related thereto were already incurred and should have been 
brought together-even if they La.I >.'.> Lo file J in district court. 
Fi irthermore, although the small claims court found there was 
"no cause of action," plaintiff :ould n »l re-file his action and he 
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failed to appeal. Consequently, this decision is one on the merits 
and not based solely on jurisdiction as argued by plaintiff. 
Based upon the forgoing, Defendant's Motion for Summary 
Judgment is granted. 
DATED this cJ> day of March, 2002. 
TabB 
HLDMnncr COURT 
Richard K. Glauser, #4324 TNrd Judicial District 
Albert W. Gray, #A6095 MAY - 6 7ffi? 
SMITH & GLAUSER, P.C. f—N ~m£ 
2180 South 1300 East, Suite 600 4s£2kK E C te^ r 
Salt Lake City, UT 84106 B y — ! g ^ > ^ &d — . 
Telephone: (609) 466-4228 Deputy Cterk 
Attorneys for Defendant 
IN THE THIRD JUDIUAI IJIS rKir.T C,C\\ IR I IN AND FOR 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
ILIA DENNIS, ) ORDER 
) 
Plaintiff, ) 
v. ) 
DAVID VASQUEZ, 906455 
Defendant. ) Judge Glenn K. Iwasaki 
The aoove-captioi n u ,. ....,,, before the Court pursuant to Defendant's motion 
for summary judgment on March 18, 2002. Albert W. Gray appeared on behalf oi 
moving party, the DefendanI, D.-ivid N 'usque;?., .md Michael A. Katz appeared on behalf of 
the Plaintiff. 
This mattei : i" i^s i i l i " i »" -JIII > <n"» H I I« »bilc ; accident occurring on October 6, 2000. On 
July 19, 2 0 0 1 , Plaintiff filed his complaint. Subsequently Defendant's insurer State r 
reached a settler t »ei it agreei i lei it v\i itl i Plaintiff and paid him $4,650.06. On February 23, 
2001 , Plaintiff filed a small claims action in the Third District Court in the amount of 
$1,227.35 for property damage as a iei. MI " '•• *•»"" On March 23, 2001 , the court 
in the small claims action entered judgment against Plaintiff stating that there was "no 
cause of action." At the hearing on Defendant's motion for summary judgment there was 
no record of the small claims proceeding available and no affidavits were presented which 
indicated the events of the small claims proceeding. 
Defendant argued summary judgment in his favor was appropriate based upon res 
judicata. Defendant's position was that Plaintiff failed to assert his bodily injury claim the 
small claims proceeding, and accordingly is barred from pursuing this action. Specifically 
Defendant argued that all the elements necessary to invoke claim preclusion under res 
judicata had been fulfilled: 
1. Both cases involved the same parties; 
2. Plaintiffs bodily injury claim could and should have been raised in the small 
claims court proceeding; and 
3. The small claims court proceeding resulted in a final judgment on the merits 
in favor of the Defendant. 
Plaintiff opposed the motion for summary judgment arguing that the decision of the 
small claims court was not on the merits, but rather was based upon the release not upon 
determination of fault. As to whether the issues are identical, Plaintiff argued the small 
claims action sought additional sums for property damage, while this complaint is seeking 
personal injury damages. Finally, it was Plaintiffs position that dismissal would compel 
Plaintiff to discharge medical bills attributable to the acts of the Defendant and such would 
be inequitable. 
2 
Madsen v. Borthick , 769 P.2d 245 (Utah 1988), sets forth the requirements for 
claims preclusion under res judicata: 
Claim preclusion bars a cause of action only if the suit in which that 
cause of action is being asserted and the prior suit satisfy three 
requirements. First, both cases must involve the same parties or their 
privies. Second, the claim that is alleged to be barred must have 
been presented in the first suit or must be one that could and should 
have been raised in the first action. Third, the first sifit must have 
resulted in a final judgment on the merits. 
Madsen v. Borthick. 769 P.2d 247, 247 (Utah 1988). 
' |: | j | in j II1 IP (.ilciieint-'Tili mull! In IliH" frills- of ihnis raso, ill iii;i inndispLiter first 
requirement in Madsen is met As for the second factor, the Restatement of Judgments 
The rule stated in this Section as to splitting a claim is applicable 
although the first action is brought in a court which has no jurisdiction 
to give a judgment for more than a designated amount. When the 
plaintiff brings an action in such a court and recovers judgment for the 
maximum amount which the court can award, he is precluded from 
thereafter maintaining an action for the balance of his claim ... it is 
assumed here that a court was available to the plaintiff in the same 
system of courts. 
In the instant matter, while exceeding the jurisdiction of the small claims court, there 
fe the personal injuries and expenses related thereto were already incurred and 
should have been brought together - even if they had to be filed in district court. 
Furthermore, although the small claims court found there was "no cause of action," 
plaintiff could not re-file his action and he failed to appeal. Consequently, this decision is 
i! me on the merits and not based solely on jurisdiction as argued by plaintiff. 
3 
The Court, having considered the motion, memoranda, exhibits attached thereto, 
and for good cause shown and based upon the foregoing including the Court's 
Memorandum Decision of March 25, 2002, it is hereby ORDERED: 
1. Defendants motion for summary judgment is granted. 
DATED this « day of ^ 7 / ^ _, 2002. 
BY THE 
The Honorable Glenn 
Third District Court Judg 
4 
Tat 
Michael A. Katz, #3817 
MICHAEL F. RICHM V ,N
 tV \ SM K i  A II 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
5684 South Green Street 
Murray, Utah 84123 
Telephone: (801) 266-5572 
Facsimile: (801)266-1387 
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
ILIA DENNIS, 
Plaintiff and Appellant, 
vs 
DAVID VASQUEZ, 
Defendant and Appellee. 
Mi in I J I i iii|/ y p M J 
1,'ase INo. tUttlHM» I5> I"! 
Judge Glenn K. Iwasaki 
Notice is hereby given that plaintiff and appellant, Ilia Dennis, through counsel Michael A. 
Katz, appeals to me >^t-\cLi^ , . u . . ; i~t, 'A\C IULL OUCI ^ u^ Honorable Glenn KL Iwasaki 
entered in this matter on May 6, 2002. The appeal is taken from the entire judgment. 
DATED this ~L 1 S c ^ day of May, 2002. 
MICHAEL F. RICHMAN & ASSOCIATES 
Michael A. Katz 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that on the dx£)AdL day of May, 2002,1 served Plaintiff and Appellant's 
NOTICE OF APPEAL upon counsel for the Defendant and Appellee in this matter, by mailing first 
class mail with sufficient postage prepaid to the following address: 
Richard K. Glauser 
Albert W. Gray 
SMITH & GLAUSER, P.C. 
2180 South 1300 East, Suite 600 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84106 
2 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
The undersigned hereby certifies that on this^-Al&t day of October, 2002, the 
foregoing APPELLANT'S BRIEF was mailed, postage fully prepaid, to: 
Albert W. Gray 
SMITH & GLAUSER 
2180 South 1300 East, Suite 600 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84106 
Attorneys for David Vasquez 
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